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Before getting into the subject of 
recent trends, I want to say a few words 
about some of the basic philosophical 
problems of international law which I'm 
sure you have discussed. I wish to make 
sure that you and I are on the same 
wavelength. I don't ask you to accept 
my thoughts about this, but I do think 
you ought to know my ideas on this 
general subject so that you can under-
stand better what I'm saying and what 
I'm trying to do. 
In the first place, as a professor of 
international law, I was never con-
cerned, and I am not really concerned 
today, as to whether international law 
does, or does not, exist as "law." I've 
never seen much point in debating that 
subject If I were to debate it, I would 
be happy to take either side of the 
question. I think it very easy to define 
law in such a way as to exclude interna-
tionallaw entirely. I think it is very easy 
to define law in such a way as to include 
it And I think that's not a subject we 
need to debate about because if I read 
naval regulations correctly, CNO has 
decided that question for us, since he 
has told you that in certain circum-
stances you should abide by interna-
tional law; therefore, I assume that he 
believes that it exists, and that we 
should assume here that it exists. 
What is clear, I think, is that states-
men, very less frequently impartial 
judges, sometimes national judges, and 
others-including naval officers-invoke, 
in justification of something that they 
are doing, or in protest against some-
thing somebody else is doing, rules of 
international law. The claim or assertion 
that they make may be generally 
accepted by others, or it may be vigor-
ously disputed by others. The dispute 
may be as to the application of a 
familiar rule to a particular fact, or as to 
the relevancy of another conflicting 
rule. (Even in our own domestic law 
system, as Justice Cardoza once noted, 
rules of law generally travel in pairs and 
opposites.) Or the dispute may be even 
as to the rule itself, the way it is 
phrased, or what it is designed to do. 
If such a dispute exists I think we 
can assume that very rarely will it be 
decided as it would be decided within a 
domestic legal system by reference to an 
impartial body of judges. More likely 
it's going to be decided in a particular 
case by whoever has the power to make 
the decision stick-whoever can make 
good that claim, or make good that 
protest. To the extent that the rule and 
its application is not generally accepted 
by others, there's going to be some 
political cost involved in making the 
claim, and there may be the additional 
cost to the state making it, arising from 
the fact that it can scarcely protest in 
the future if others do the same thing. 
Now nobody would contend that 
that is a very satisfactory legal system, 
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or even that it works very well, But I 
think it would be hard to deny that 
there are a number of rules of interna-
tional law which are normally and cus-
tomarily adhered to by states in spite of 
variations and differences in formula-
tion and application, and that these 
rules do, in fact, influence decisions, 
actions taken, and policies promulgated 
by various states and other participants 
in international political arenas. In this 
limited sense, at least, the existence of 
these rules, and their acceptance, does 
contribute significantly to order and to 
the structure of expectations within the 
international community. The rules 
which are most effective and most 
strictly adhered to are, of course, those 
in which mutual advantage is perceived 
in the existence of the rule and in the 
order which that rule gives. A good deal 
of the law of the sea, for example, 
survived for precisely this reason, and 
has survived for a long time. And those 
parts which are most in doubt-the 
three or six or two hundred-mile limits-
are those in which at least some states 
have not perceived a mutual advantage 
in the rule from their viewpoint. 
Now the second point I would make 
by way of introduction is also quite an 
obvious one, and that is that any rule, 
no matter how accepted, may be 
breached by any state at any time. If a 
state believes that the immediate advan-
tage to it of ignoring a generally 
accepted rule is greater than its interest 
in the rule itself-and it can get away 
with it-the rule breaks down. Usually 
these are situations of crisis and I think 
it's useful to remember that even in a 
developed domestic legal system, rules 
frequently break down in times of great 
stress and crisis. To say that this is a 
question of weak enforcement of inter-
national law is, I think, to beg the entire 
problem. 
The third introductory point that I 
want to make is that any legal system is 
necessarily a part of a political system. 
It it unmitigated nonsense to talk, for 
example, about "world law" unless 
you're willing to talk about world gov-
ernment at the same time, because 
you're not going to have a developed 
legal system in the international com-
munity, as you would not in a domestic 
community, unless you have a devel-
oped governmental system and political 
system at the same time. The legal 
system of any community is just as 
developed, no more and no less, as the 
political system. 
The final introductory point that I 
want to make is the very obvious 
connection between law and policy, and 
law and politics. Every rule of law, 
every rule of behavior, in any society, 
domestic or international, reflects a 
policy; it's designed to serve a policy by 
the person or people who formulate the 
rule. We see this very clearly, I think, in 
the domestic picture because, in fact, 
most of our law is made in the Congress 
and in the State Legislatures, although 
at times it isn't easy to get them to 
enact law. 
In the international community you 
don't have the kind of separation of 
powers that we have in the domestic 
community. You don't have a legislative 
branch to enact the laws; you don't 
have an executive branch to carry them 
out; you don't have a judiciary to rule 
with respect to disputes; and these 
functions are tied together so that under 
the guise of impartially applying a rule 
of international law, what you may be 
doing is formulating a little bit of 
international policy that from the view-
point of the person saying it, would 
seem to be a sound policy for his 
particular government, and perhaps for 
the international community as he sees 
it or would like to see it. We can, 
therefore, see these rules shifting and 
changing with somewhat more un-
certainty, somewhat more flexibility, in 
somewhat less of a developed system. It 
is helpful to think of this process in 
terms of efforts within international 
society by these various participants to 
formulate what we would call in a more 
dcveloped system a legislative policy-to 
formulate rules which they believe 
would usefully serve participants within 
the international community. Thus any 
discussion of recent trends of interna-
tional law has to take account of the 
changed political structure of the world 
community, of the new problems, the 
new political groupings, which have 
come to pass in what is often a too 
rapidly changing, as well as a too 
dangerous world. 
Most of the international law doc-
trine that we have-that you have been 
studying-is inherited from the 19th 
century. It developed throughout the 
last part of the 18th century, and it 
became a relatively developed system of 
rules in the 19th century. To under-
stand how that set of rules came about 
and what the differences are today, and 
to understand trends, we ought to look 
at the political system which then pre-
vailed and particularly its security 
aspects. Fundamentally any system of 
law is designed at heart to preserve 
order as well as to serve other policies 
within the community. It's an effort to 
create an orderly way of doing things, 
and an orderly way of doing things 
means, at a minimum, that you remove, 
as much as possible, violence or the 
threat of violence. These rules de-
veloped as a system of law governing 
states within the international com-
munity. They became a developed sys-
tem as nation-states developed. 
Now what was the security system in 
which this operated and what were the 
cssentials of that system? The security 
system was quite obviously the balance 
of power system which characterized 
international society and achieved its 
most developed form in the 19th cen-
tury. The essentials of that system were 
that you had a group primarily of 
European states which were mutually 
suspicious and whose best security lay 
in a system of flexible alliances. That is, 
the best way of preserving peace within 
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that system was to align yourselves with 
others. If one alliance became stronger 
than the other, there was a real risk of 
war, and the members of the weaker 
alliance could offer to a member of the 
stronger alliance the necessary incentive 
to move over into that alliance. A 
shifting series of alliances is what I mean 
by flexibility of alliance. Thus, any state 
within that system had to be willing to 
get up and dance with any other partner 
within it. And that, I think, is essential 
to understanding much of the legal 
doctrine that ve have inherited. 
Within the balance of power system 
war was not )utlawed formally; it was 
legally nobod {'s business but the state 
making it. Vv e got away from earlier 
concepts of rights and wrongs of war, 
and simply ·jepended entirely upon this 
political sy·,tem. 
There '~ere other characteristics to it. 
If you are going to be willing to change 
partners, one of the things you can't 
afford to do is get involved in ideologi-
cal disputes with other countries. You 
have got to take them as you find them, 
if you are going to join them, or if you 
may have to join them and switch from 
one alliance to another. And so you 
have a very strong rule in the 19th 
century of noninterference in the in-
ternal affairs of other states; at least 
other strong states. In fact, states were 
defined in such a way as to have viable 
entities that were capable of preserving 
their own independence, and not be-
coming pawns of someone else-a 
characteristic which is clearly not the 
case today. 
Now, in addition to that security 
system there existed throughout the 
European countries during the 19th 
century a common ideological basis, at 
least with respect to economics. You 
didn't have it with respect to politics. It 
was an age of revolution. But you had it 
with respect to economics. There was 
the dominance of laissez faire as a 
philosophy shared by virtually all of the 
participants. One of the conditions 
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which a state had to be able to attain to 
be a "state" was to preserve enough 
domestic order so that others could 
trade with it and do business with it. 
They had to share a variety of rules with 
the more developed countries which 
permitted foreign investment, at least in 
the sense of foreign trading. Only if 
they preserved a system of local law and 
order which was sophisticated enough 
to allow you to trade with them, could 
they really hope to maintain their inde-
pendence. Within those areas of the 
world where those conditions were not 
possible to achieve, trade led to a 
considerable growth of colonialism in-
herited from an even earlier day, and 
then a series of protectorates and man-
dates. There was very little interference 
in the internal affairs of these countries 
aside from maintaining sufficient order 
to do business with them. And I would 
remind you just briefly in passing that 
the whole concept of the freedom of 
the seas which I will discuss a little bit 
later on, is very closely related to laissez 
faire philosophy-to the economic 
freedom which existed. 
Now the security system began to 
break down when the alliances became 
less flexible toward the end of the 19th 
century. I am inclined to think (I think 
a lot of historians would dispute me) 
that it broke down in large part because 
France and Germany had to be lined up 
on the opposite sides of the balance, 
and Alsace may have been one of the 
important reasons why it broke down. 
But be that as it may, it began to lose its 
flexibility-began to become impossible 
to shift-and as a result we had the first 
world war. 
In the interwar period there took 
place a series of rather vague efforts to 
find some new kind of security system-
treaties, resort to courts-the Hague 
Tribunal, the League of Nations, and 
efforts of this kind, because the alliance 
system no longer could be counted 
upon. The complicated economic 
system was breaking down, too. 
Throughout that period there grew up a 
good deal of economic nationalism, 
changing somewhat the character of 
war, the character of military prepared-
ness, and certainly changing the free 
economic system which had existed. 
There was an effort to replace this with, 
as I said, the League of Nations. It 
always has seemed to me a vague re-
sponse to a real problem, an effort to 
create parliamentary government on an 
international basis. A lot of idealism was 
involved in it, and whatever its defects 
nobody came up with anything very 
much better. The effort, of course, of 
the French and the British throughout 
that period, was to recreate an alliance 
system, which was probably just as 
hopeless. 
Let me skip World War II. What kind 
of a system are we operating in today? 
What kind of a political system is 
in ternational law operating within 
today? Clearly it is a very different 
system from the 19th century system 
and it's different in many important 
respects. First, it is no longer exclusively 
a state system, although states exist and 
states are still important participants. 
But what we really have today, morc 
and more, are groupings of states-
acting together-rather than single states 
each pursuing its own individual in-
terest. 
After World War II, with the emer-
gence of Russia as a major power, and 
the emergence of the Communist Party 
as a very important new element in 
international politics, we faced the 
effort by the Russians to dominate 
other nations through the device of the 
Communist Party. This technique of 
disciplining people, taking over a local 
government, and operating that govern-
ment in conjunction with the domestic 
and foreign policy of a foreign state, 
was totally different from the express 
forms of domination of the 19th cen-
tury. 
The response to the communist 
threat of the West, which had no 
equivalent to the Communist Party and 
no desire to dominate internal affairs of 
other countries, was to create a group of 
states, acting together with respect to 
certain limited matters, as, for example, 
NATO. Although formally set up as a 
treaty arrangement of a group of sepa-
rate states, actually NATO went far 
beyond that in its planning, in its 
attitude, and in the way in which it did 
business. We did not have, and don't 
have today, the complete separation of 
statcs within NATO that would have 
characterized the 19th century system. 
There were other than military insti-
tutions that were created-other group-
ings of states for various limited pur-
poses. And so there was created within 
the Western world a kind of supra-
national authority, within limited areas 
-not always strong, but viable and 
continuing and existing. 
In addition, there took place the 
emergence of the new nations of the 
world, made possible by this change in 
the political structure, or at least 
speeded along by this change. They have 
a rather different attitude than new 
states of the past. Nationalism has 
served, as it has always served, its 
function of being a unifying force. But 
there are the problems of a colonial 
heritage, some of the fears that go with 
it; and coming out of that, a tendency 
toward neutralism, fear of alliances, 
demands for social progress, for help, 
but always without interference in their 
internal affairs. 
And, of course, we have too, the 
United Nations. Perhaps I should have 
started with the United Nations, be-
cause in the League it had a predecessor 
with, it seems to me, unclear ideas-or 
perhaps conflicting ideas-as to what it 
might do, and what it might accomplish 
within the society. Whatever the aspira-
tion and the hope, it has become clear 
that there are very basic divisions within 
the world, and it has become clear that 
major powers can't rely upon the 
United Nations as any kind of a security 
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system. It can serve, and does serve, 
other useful functions. It does, for 
example, improve communication. It 
certainly has served a very useful func-
tion for the new nations who are heavily 
represented, particularly in the General 
Assembly, and who have an opportunity 
thus to make demands and to air prob-
lems whieh would qot otherwise be 
aired. But the possibility of the United 
Nations taking strong and vigorous 
action is limited to the relatively few 
situations where the interest of major 
powers, particularly the United States 
and Russia, are likely either to coincide, 
or, at least, not to conflict. 
I suggest that the real developments 
of international law are not in terms of 
a universal international law with rules 
equally applicable to all. More signifi-
cant growth has been within these 
groupings of states. We have had a 
development of regionalism, and, more 
importantly, of functional approaches 
to shared problems. 
Now some development has been 
accomplished on a universal basis, but it 
has become more of a pragmatic ap-
proach, less of a doctrinal one. We have, 
for example, on a universal basis, not 
done badly on meterological or health 
problems. Within smaller functional 
groupings we have, I think done quite 
well. 
I have already mentioned NATO in 
particular; there are other alliances with 
some similarity-the regional organiza-
tions such as the Organization of Ameri-
can States-all with some small elements 
at least of supranationalism, some small 
elements of acting together as an entity, 
of working together to solve problems. 
Far more dramatic has been the devel-
opment of the Common Market. We 
have something very close, with distinct 
supranational characteristics, to the 
creation of a new federal state within 
Europe. This is a situation which would 
have been wholly impossible in the 19th 
century. No European state could have 
afforded to create those kinds of bonds 
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and ties. No state could have afforded 
to have delegated to other authorities, 
to supranational authorities, so much 
power over its own economy, over its 
own trade, and over many of the most 
important functions of government. In 
fact, I do not believe that any of the 
members of the Common Market, had it 
existed in the 19th century, could have 
met the traditional international law 
definition of what a state was. 
Now what has this meant, this 
change in the political structure, with 
respect to changes in legal doctrine? The 
one point I have given major emphasis 
to is that we really are somewhat less 
concerned today with finding universal 
rules which will be applicable to all 
states within the community. It seems 
to me the area of progress, the area of 
development, the area of excitement, is 
the area which says, How do we get 
together to solve a problem which is 
common to all of us? And this is the 
kind of activity that we have had 
occasionally on a universal basis, or 
close to a universal basis (I have men-
tioned some of the examples), and on a 
military or security basis within other 
groupings. It exists with respect to 
economic development within still other 
groupings. 
There are also necessary changes as 
the result of all the technology and the 
change in politics. You have looked at 
the laws of war. It seems to me that 
there are obvious changes with respect 
to the law of war. This doesn't mean it 
is all to be thrown out the window. Not 
all of the inherited doctrine is inappli-
cable in this new situation, but it has to 
be adjusted to it. And I think today that 
you would have far less confidence in 
those areas of the inherited rules of law 
with respect to warfare, particularly in 
terms of protection of private property, 
with respect to theft aspects, and even 
more particularly with respect to laws 
of neu trality (I am assuming here that 
this is not an atomic war, that it's a 
limited war of some kind). I think you 
would have an absence-an obvious 
absence-of powerful neutrals, and the 
power of the neutrals which supported 
the inherited doctrine up to World War I 
and partly through it; rules of neutrality 
are likely to go by the board in con-
siderable measures. Some can survive. 
That is, in a limited war perhaps you 
can respect the territory of various 
other states. I think very little of the 
rights of neutrals on the high seas would 
be expected to survive, and you would 
have the sort of change that you already 
had in World War II with respect to the 
law of the sea in war. 
Other doctrinal rules have changed 
dramatically. We have foreign troops 
today stationed on the soil of other 
nations; some of our troops are abroad; 
the troops of others are here and in 
other countries. This was an unheard of 
proposition in peacetime within a 19th 
century system. And it has meant that 
there is a whole body of law which has 
grown up with respect to this peacetime 
stationing of troops, coming in on the 
invitation of a foreign government, and 
various rules of conduct in respeet to 
them which have grown up and which I 
would expect to be developing. 
There was a lot of doctrine, some of 
it nonsense, about measures short of 
war, and a fair amount of freedom on 
the part of major powers to go into 
certain parts of the world to protect 
certain values which were shared bv 
other states, if they could do so und~r 
circumstances which gave assurance that 
this was not an effort to conquer. A 
good deal of that, perhaps not all of it, 
has gone because of the change in the 
political system. 
In the law of the sea which you have 
studied, I am sure you have found that 
giving a forum for the first time to 
nonmaritime powers with respect to 
formulating rules of the sea, has led to 
considerable changes in those rules. The 
law of the sea was really a law created 
by the United Kingdom, but quite 
acceptable to all maritime powers, but 
as we have gotten into larger multi-
lateral arenas smaller nations have had a 
voice. Whcre these have not been mari-
time nations, the three-mile limit faded 
before a desire to monopolize fish on 
the part of some small and poor coun-
tries, who for the first time have had a 
voice and have used that voice (in what 
I think is a mistaken way) to promote 
their own interest by extending their 
control as a way of subsidizing their 
fishing industries. 
I have already mentioned changes in 
terms of the participants-that no longer 
do we just have states. We have a lot of 
other participants within the interna-
tional community taking active roles and 
governed by rules of international law. 
And I take it that the problems of 
communist domination have raised very 
new questions for us in terms of internal 
subversion, and in terms of aiding and 
abetting revolution, not merely because 
you didn't like the existing government, 
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but as a technique of foreign domination. 
These, then, are the trends that I see: 
More efforts to solve in groups of states 
certain functional problems, continuing 
with a heavy emphasis on security mea-
sures, but also including and developing 
more and more efforts at economic 
development, and of creating in response 
to the demands of many countries better 
economies, more viable governments, 
and governments which are not domi-
nated by any foreign power. I would see 
these attempts at problem-solving as a 
great growth of international law, less 
universalism but still a great growth 
among the nations marked by the growth 
of institutions that don't break apart. It 
is, and will be, a period of flux, of crisis, 
and considerable shaking down of rules-
a time of shaking them up and shaking 
them down to the point that one would 
sometimes doubt if they still existed. But 
I would expect some survival in some 
form for most of these. 
----'¥----
